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THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY 
CLAUSES OF THE ICCPR AND THE ECHR 
M. TODD PARKER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of religion, though forming part of the “core” of most 
conceptions of human rights, continues to remain a “particularly 
controversial right.”1  While religious liberty is now viewed by the 
international community as a “privilege that is so foundational and 
precious that it should be guaranteed by international law,” its scope 
and function remain open to significant debate and disagreement.2  
Some attribute this tension in part to religious claims to “possession 
of [] absolute truth,” which may result in lack of respect for the 
freedom of members of other faiths.3  In addition, some religious 
authorities view conversion to other religions as punishable heresy, 
and thus reject religious freedom as antithetical to their core religious 
values.4 
In addition to these specifically religious reasons for narrowing 
the scope of religious freedom, governments in many regions of the 
world actively deny religious liberty.  This denial ranges from the 
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 1. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 309-10 (1993). 
 2. ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST?: BALANCING RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2004). 
 3. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 310. 
 4. Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 981, 992 (2004). 
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genocide of religious minorities5 to rigid restrictions on churches’ 
governance and practice.6  Even more passively, it can take the form 
of a government’s refusal to officially recognize a church (after 
repeated applications for such recognition), thereby significantly 
inhibiting the church’s ability to function as a church body.7 
The most severe restrictions on religious freedom leave no doubt 
as to their violation of international human rights provisions as 
embodied in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).  However, because these documents 
allow governments to limit religious freedom under certain 
circumstances, less egregious impingements involve close questions as 
to whether they are justifiable restrictions under the “necessity” 
provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR. 
This Article will examine whether the restrictions on religious 
freedom found in a number of current legislative statutes around the 
world—and defended on any of a number of the “necessity” 
grounds—are justifiable under the necessity clauses of the ICCPR 
and the ECHR.8  The focus of the Article will be on the manifestation 
of religious belief, rather than on the freedom to believe privately 
whatever one wishes (recognized by both instruments as a right that 
may never be limited by government).  Part I will describe the 
relevant textual provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, along with 
commentary interpreting those texts, and will describe general 
principles of law developed by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (EC) in deciding cases 
under the two instruments.  Part II will describe and examine HRC 
and EC case law as it has developed principles for evaluating whether 
legislation restricting religious freedom is justifiable under the 
 
 5. See generally Nathan A. Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious 
Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2000) (providing detailed descriptions of 
the slaughter of religious minorities in Armenia, Bosnia, and Sudan, as well as other instances of 
slavery, forced labor, and torture of religious minorities). 
 6. See Philpott, supra note 4, at 991 (describing such practices in China during the mid to 
late 1990s). 
 7. See Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep 
306, 332 (2002) (holding that such a refusal did violate church members’ freedom of religion). 
 8. This Article will examine the laws of several states, but will not be concerned with 
whether each state is bound by either the ICCPR or the ECHR.  The concern is with certain 
types of laws and whether they pass muster under these two significant human rights 
instruments and the judicial bodies that exercise jurisdiction over the disputes arising under 
them. 
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necessity clauses.  Part III will evaluate several current laws and argue 
that certain recurring language in the laws is problematic under the 
ICCPR and the ECHR.  Part IV will describe and critique the 
“principle of secularism” as a distinct justification for restricting 
religious freedom.  This Part will argue that the principle of 
secularism as it is being defined and applied, particularly in EC 
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient justification for restrictions on 
religious freedom.  Finally, Part V will consider the case of a Swedish 
pastor who was convicted for preaching against homosexuality as a 
test case for application of the laws discussed in Part III and the 
principle of secularism discussed in Part IV.  This part will contend 
that the Swedish pastor’s conviction was not justifiable under the 
ECHR and the ICCPR necessity clauses, and that to the extent the 
laws discussed in Part III and the principle of secularism discussed in 
Part IV can be read to proscribe the pastor’s sermon, they violate the 
two instruments and should not be given effect. 
I.  THE ICCPR AND THE ECHR 
A. The Right 
Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR both declare 
that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion.9  Both also declare that this freedom is individual and 
 
 9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  Article 18 of the ICCPR states: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
Id.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
9, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter ECHR].  Article 9 of the ECHR states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
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collective, embracing the private, inner-life of religious belief (the 
forum internum10), as well as the public manifestation of religious 
belief, individually or in community, in the form of worship, 
observance, practice, and teaching.11  The forum internum is inviolable 
in both documents and subject to none of the possible limitations to 
which the manifestation of religion is subject.  Manfred Nowak calls 
freedom of religion and belief in the private realm “passive” freedom, 
in that states are prohibited “from dictating or forbidding confession 
to or membership in a religion or belief.”12  The other part of this 
private realm not subjected to restriction under the ICCPR is practice 
that does not touch upon the freedom and sphere of privacy of others, 
but instead “primarily relates to the practice of religious rituals and 
customs in the home, either alone or in community with others.”13 
The freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice, and teaching is the more public freedom of 
religion that is subject to limitation under both Article 18 and Article 
9.  According to the EC, the freedom to manifest one’s religion 
protects acts which are “intimately linked” to religious belief, “such 
as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a 
religion or belief in a generally recognised form.”14  The term 
“practice” does not, according to the Court, “cover any act which is 
motivated or influenced by a religion or belief,” and one does not 
necessarily have the right “to behave in the public sphere in a manner 
dictated by a religion or a conviction.”15  According to Nowak, 
worship under the ICCPR means the “typical form of religious prayer 
 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
 10. P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 541 (1998). 
 11. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18.; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9. 
 12. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 317.  This freedom, according to Nowak, not only confers the 
right to select from among existing religions or beliefs but also includes the “negative freedom 
not to belong to any such group or to live without religious confession.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
 13. Id. at 319. 
 14. Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294, 307 (1997). 
 15. Id.  Van Dijk and van Hoof say that while the European Commission on Human Rights 
puts a “broad interpretation” on the terms “religion” and “belief,” “this does not mean that 
every individual opinion or preference is a ‘religion or belief.’”  Instead, the concept has in mind 
views that “attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.”  VAN DIJK 
& VAN HOOF, supra note 10, at 548. 
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and preaching, i.e., freedom of ritual”; observance “covers 
processions, wearing of religious clothing . . . , prayer and all other 
customs and rites of the various religions”; and teaching “is 
understood as every form of imparting the substance of a religion or 
belief.”16  In the General Comments to the ICCPR, “practice” seems 
to overlap with both observance and teaching, and includes the 
“freedom to choose [] religious leaders, priests and teachers, the 
freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom 
to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.”17  Nowak, in 
recognition of the need for “practice” not to include every action or 
omission motivated by religion or belief, says, “Religious practice 
may thus be said to be only that conduct obviously related to a 
religious conviction.”18 
B. The Restrictions 
Because the public manifestation of religion has the potential to 
interfere with the rights of others or to pose a danger to society, it is 
not absolute.  Using slightly different language, both Article 18 of the 
ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR subject the manifestation of 
religion or belief to such limitations that are “prescribed by law” and 
are necessary in the interests of public safety to protect public order, 
health, or morals, or to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others.19  The General Comments to Article 18 say that these 
limitations are to be strictly interpreted such that only the listed 
restrictions are allowed.20  Further, limitations must be “directly 
related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are 
predicated,” and “may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or 
applied in a discriminatory manner.”21  One author points out that 
almost all of the ICCPR limitation clauses use the word “necessary,” 
indicating that restrictions on rights “are permissible only when they 
 
 16. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321. 
 17. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience and Religion (Art. 18), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4  (July 30, 1993), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Open 
Document [hereinafter General Comment No. 22]. 
 18. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321. 
 19. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18, ¶ 3; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9, ¶ 3. 
 20. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, at ¶ 8. 
 21. Id. 
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are essential, i.e., inevitable.”22  Accordingly, the EC has narrowly 
construed the “prescribed by law” requirement in order to 
circumvent hiding religious freedom violations behind domestic law. 
In Kalaç v. Turkey, the Court said that the requirement is designed to 
ensure “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against 
arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights 
safeguarded by paragraph 2.”23 
C. Pluralism as Axiomatic 
Both the EC and the HRC have indicated that the principle of 
pluralism is fundamental when considering the justifiability of a 
restriction on religious freedom.  The EC has indicated that 
government restrictions on religious freedom may be necessary at 
times in order to “reconcile the interests of differing groups and to 
ensure respect for the convictions of all.”24  The “State must remain 
neutral and impartial,” however, with an aim to the “maintenance of 
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy,” rather than with 
an aim to “remove the cause of the tensions by doing away with 
pluralism.”25  In the context of the freedom of association, the 
restriction of which requires justifications similar to Article 9, the EC 
has said, “The autonomy of religious communities is in fact 
indispensable to pluralism in a democratic society.”26 
In Kokkinakis v. Greece and Manoussakis v. Greece, the EC even 
more explicitly affirmed religious pluralism as a guiding principle 
when answering the question of whether a law restricting religious 
freedom is “necessary in a democratic society.”  In Manoussakis, the 
EC recognized a “margin of appreciation” in assessing whether 
contracting states could restrict religious liberty, but noted that “[i]n 
delimiting the extent of the margin of appreciation . . . the Court must 
have regard to what is at stake, namely the need to secure true 
religious pluralism, an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic 
 
 22. Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 308 (Louis Henkin ed., 
1981). 
 23. Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep 552, 560 (1999). 
 24. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 306, 
335 (2002) (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 419 (1994)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 336. 
03__PARKER.DOC 3/9/2007  10:04 AM 
2006] THE FREEDOM TO MANIFEST RELIGIOUS BELIEF 97 
society.”27  In Kokkinakis, the EC said that freedom of religion “is 
one of the foundations of a democratic society” and “the pluralism 
indissociable from a democratic society which has been dearly won 
over the centuries depends on it.”28  The General Comments to 
Article 18 of the ICCPR do not use the term pluralism, but require 
that states parties proceed with an attitude of “equality and non-
discrimination” toward all religions.29  Further, in a dissenting opinion 
in Westerman v. Netherlands, an HRC member argued that 
“conscientious objection is based on a pluralistic conception of 
society in which acceptance rather than coercion is the decisive 
factor.”30 
Professor W. Cole Durham has called the principle of pluralism a 
“fundamental axiom of international human rights.”31  Professor 
Michael McConnell, in analyzing U.S. religious liberty jurisprudence, 
has advocated an “animating principle [of] pluralism and diversity” 
over the “maintenance of a scrupulous secularism in all aspects of 
public life touched by government” that in his view has too often 
typified U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence.32  He has 
also said, “My position is that the Religion Clauses do not create a 
secular public sphere . . . .  Rather, the purpose of the Religion 
Clauses is to protect the religious lives of the people from 
unnecessary intrusions of government, whether promoting or 
 
 27. Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 407 (1997) (citing 
Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 418). 
 28. Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 418 (emphasis and punctuation removed).  Though 
Article 18 of the ICCPR does not contain the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” in its 
limiting language, the idea of “necessity” is certainly present and seems to present the same 
basic question as posed in the ECHR.  In discussing the choice to leave out the particular phrase 
in the ICCPR, one scholar has noted that, “It is difficult . . . to find a basis for concluding that 
the omissions are significant.”  Kiss, supra note 22, at 306.  Alexandre Charles Kiss also offers 
possible explanations for the omission while retaining the essential meaning of the phrase.  See 
id. at 490 n.67. 
 29. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 8. 
 30. Human Rights Comm. Decision, No. 682/1996, at ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/67/D/682/1996 (1999) (dissenting opinion by committee member H. Solari Yrigoyen). 
 31. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Pluralism as a Factor in Peace, 2003 FIDES ET 
LIBERTAS 43, 44.  Durham argues that pluralism is essential to peace, because peace in a 
pluralistic world “is best maintained through building structures of mutual understanding and 
respect.”  Id.  Arguing along similar lines, Nathan Adams says “religious tolerance may be 
essential to ensure the continued viability of the international rule of law.”  Adams, supra note 
5, at 34.  While Durham and Adams ultimately disagree as to the propriety of religious 
“absolutism,” both see pluralism as essential to peace. 
 32. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.115, 116 
(1992). 
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hindering religion.  It is to foster a regime of religious pluralism, as 
distinguished from both majoritarianism and secularism.”33  
According to McConnell, his religious pluralism view of the religion 
clauses in the U.S. Constitution contrasts with the Warren and Burger 
Courts’ “mission to protect democratic society from religion.”34  
While this view is in specific reference to religious liberty in the 
United States, it echoes the ECHR’s view of an “indissociable” union 
between democratic society and religious pluralism.35 
The commentators mentioned above are careful to note that 
protecting a robust pluralism does not require relativizing belief.  
Durham specifically argues that states “should insist on tolerance and 
mutual respect among citizens, but may not insist that believers 
compromise or relativize their commitment to the truths in which 
they believe.”36  He warns against the view that would equate 
exclusivist truth claims with “extremism,” and notes that a religious 
community “can claim that its beliefs are true without believing that 
its beliefs may be imposed on others.”37  McConnell similarly eschews 
the idea that protecting pluralism means requiring religious claims to 
be “tamed, cheapened, and secularized” in order to find a place 
alongside the beliefs of fellow citizens in public life.38  Applying these 
principles to the EC and HRC, one must not mistake the EC’s 
recognition of the government’s role in ensuring “mutual tolerance” 
as a requirement that religions relativize the fundamental tenets of 
their religion.  Indeed, in the context of freedom of expression, the 
 
 33. Id. at 117.  Echoing the “autonomy of religious communities” sentiment of the ECHR, 
McConnell adds that religious pluralism is “to preserve what Madison called the ‘full and equal 
rights’ of religious believers and communities to define their own way of life, so long as they do 
not interfere with the rights of others, and to participate fully and equally with their fellow 
citizens in public life without being forced to shed their religious convictions and character.”  Id. 
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison, June 8, 
1789)). 
 34. Id. at 120. 
 35. Note that the pluralistic view espoused by Durham, McConnell, and the ECHR should 
not be confused with an “unimpaired flourishing” view of religious liberty, since a pluralistic 
view of religion will still admit to government restriction in appropriate circumstances.  See 
generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 577 (1996) (offering a very interesting critique of this view and an equally 
interesting espousal of their “equal regard” religious liberty approach). 
 36. Durham, supra note 31, at 51. 
 37. Id. 
 38. McConnell, supra note 32, at 127.  He says, “The Court does not object to a little 
religion in our public life.  But the religion must be tamed cheapened, and secularized . . . .  
Authentic religion must be shoved to the margins of public life.”  Id. 
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Court has said that protection extends not only to popular views, “but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”39 
Accepting religious pluralism in principle does not answer the 
more specific question of whether and to what extent government 
may legitimately constrain religious freedom as an exercise of 
necessity in particular cases.  However, a commitment to genuine 
religious pluralism should limit a government’s ability to restrict 
religious freedom on the ground that public manifestation of religious 
ideas or practice somehow constitute a per se threat to democratic 
government.  To the extent that pluralism as a prescriptive norm is 
“indissociable” from democracy itself, a government restriction on 
manifestations of religious belief—ostensibly because such a 
restriction is “necessary” to protect that society—bears the burden of 
showing that a true, identifiable necessity exists to justify the 
restriction.  Specifically, a government must show that curbing 
religious freedom in a particular instance will not violate the 
axiomatic principle of religious pluralism, and by extension, 
democracy itself.  Such a view does not preclude appropriately 
specific justifications for curbing religious freedom, but guards against 
an inversion of the principle that would view robust expression of 
religious ideas and practice as somehow inimical to a democratic 
society, and thus subject to restriction simply by virtue of its religious 
nature or the content of the religious expression. 
D. Margin of Appreciation and Level of Scrutiny 
Finally, the EC and the HRC have had to determine how they 
should apply these principles in particular cases.  In order to “balance 
general societal interests against the interests of the individual or 
group adversely affected by the state’s action,” the EC has begun to 
develop standards of review guided by its “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine.40  Under the doctrine, national governments are given some 
discretion as to the manner in which they implement ECHR rights.41  
 
 39. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/ 98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 36 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 1, 32-33 (2003). 
 40. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 391, 446, 451 (2001). 
 41. Id. at 451.  Donoho calls the doctrine “one of the EC[]’s primary tools for 
accommodating diversity, national sovereignty, and the will of domestic majorities, while 
enforcing effective implementation of rights under the European Convention.”  Id.  The EC has 
noted that the substance of the notion of public order “varied on account of national 
characteristics.”  Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 405 (1997). 
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When a state’s law falls “within a predictably amorphous range of 
acceptable alternatives,” the Court is likely to uphold the state’s law 
as within the margin of appreciation.42  Similarly, the HRC has 
indicated its willingness to look at “context” in assessing alleged 
violations of the ICCPR.  In Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, the 
Committee concluded that there had been a violation of Article 18 of 
the ICCPR, and noted that it had reached its decision “duly taking 
into account the specifics of the context.”43 
While the margin of appreciation recognizes the freedom of 
European states to exercise some measure of sovereignty, the level of 
discretion given to the national government depends to a large degree 
on the content of the right at issue.44  The more fundamental the right, 
the more specifically the limitation must be tailored to the aim sought 
and the more the means chosen must be proportional to a legitimate 
end.45  The scrutiny encouraged by the ICCPR is similar in its 
requirement that a restriction on religious liberty be “proportional in 
severity and intensity to the purpose being sought.”46  Importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the EC has specified that restrictions on 
religious freedom “call for very strict scrutiny by the Court.”47  Thus, 
while the Court will consider the margin of appreciation and take 
restrictions on religious freedom on a case-by-case basis because of 
 
 42. Donoho, supra note 40, at 452. 
 43. Human Rights Comm. Decision, No. 931/2000, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2005) (holding that a practicing Muslim woman had a right to wear her 
headscarf during classes at a state institution).  One of the dissenters in the case agreed with the 
need “to take into account the context in which the restrictions contemplated by those clauses 
[the “necessity” clauses contained in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, and 22] are applied” but criticized 
the Committee for saying that it had taken context into account when the state party offered no 
explanation for the basis on which it was seeking to justify the restriction on religious dress.  Id. 
at Individual Opinion (dissenting) by Comm. Member Sir Nigel Rodley. 
 44. See Donoho, supra note 40, at 454-55.  Donoho says the ECHR has developed a 
“hierarchy of rights, deeming some so fundamental to a democratic society that little discretion 
is allowed to national governments.”  Id. 
 45. See id. at 454.  Donoho also notes that “the Court’s jurisprudence for balancing 
individual and state interests is strikingly similar to that utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court 
when faced with similar issues.”  Id. at 454 n.179. 
 46. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 325 (emphasis removed).  One commentator has urged the 
formation of an international compelling interest test in order to limit the justifications a state 
can offer for restricting religious freedom.  He says such a test “presumptively excludes 
justifications for violations of religious liberty on grounds of subversion, order, immorality, or 
disrespect for religion or a religious figure, while permitting the state to demonstrate compelling 
reasons for departing from this rule to address internationally recognized problems like 
terrorism, sectarian violence, and female genital mutilation.”  Adams, supra note 5, at 63. 
 47. Manoussakis v. Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 407 (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
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the inherently fact-sensitive balancing between the right and the 
government necessity, the government bears the heavy burden of 
showing that a limitation is actually “necessary” and that it is 
narrowly tailored toward that necessary end. 
II.  JUDICIAL APPLICATION: SPECIFIC CASES48 
Before moving to an assessment of current laws in light of the 
above-mentioned general principles, the Article now proceeds to a 
brief examination of specific EC cases that have considered when and 
if a restriction on religious freedom meets the necessity requirements. 
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the EC found that 
the government’s refusal to officially recognize the Church of 
Bessarabia was an interference with its freedom of religion.49  The EC 
said that the government was pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting 
against the revival of long-standing rivalries between Russia and 
Romania which could endanger the social peace and territorial 
integrity of Moldova.50  However, refusal to recognize the applicant 
church was not a legitimate means to fulfill this aim because the 
government was not acting neutrally and impartially, its concerns 
about national security and territorial integrity were “purely 
hypothetical,” and the significant consequences for religious freedom 
were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.51  Thus, the EC 
upheld the ICCPR and ECHR requirement that a restriction be 
proportionate to its goal. 
In Manoussakis v. Greece, the EC found a violation of Article 9 
when Jehovah’s Witnesses were prosecuted for “establish[ing] and 
operat[ing] a place of worship without first obtaining the 
authorization[] required by law.”52  The government argued that the 
authorization measures, which included the Greek Orthodox Church 
in the approval process and criminalized the use of a non-authorized 
place of worship, served to protect public order and the rights of 
others.53  This was the case, the government contended, because the 
Orthodox church had played a vital role in Greek history, because 
 
 48. Research for this Article did not uncover any significant HRC cases for this particular 
section.  The discussion on secularism below does include several HRC cases. 
 49. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep., 306, 
332 (2002). 
 50. Id. at 334. 
 51. Id. at 339-41. 
 52. Manoussakis, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 387. 
 53. Id. at 405. 
03__PARKER.DOC 3/9/2007  10:04 AM 
102 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:91 
virtually the entire population of Greece was Christian Orthodox, and 
because “sects sought to manifest their ideas and doctrines using all 
sorts of ‘unlawful and dishonest’ means,” and were “socially 
dangerous.”54  The EC said that “States are entitled to verify whether 
a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of 
religious aims, activities which are harmful to the population,” and 
held that the protection of public order was a legitimate aim under 
the circumstances.55  However, the EC held that Article 9 had been 
violated because the law had been used to “impose rigid, or indeed 
prohibitive, conditions on practice of religious beliefs by certain non-
orthodox movements” and “to restrict the activities of faiths outside 
the Orthodox church.”56  The EC concluded by saying that the 
convictions had such a “direct effect on . . . freedom of religion that 
[they] cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, nor, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society.”57  
The case illustrates the limits of the margin of appreciation doctrine 
when the impact on religious freedom is direct and not narrowly 
tailored to a legitimate aim. 
In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the EC overturned the conviction of a 
Jehovah’s Witness who was convicted of improper proselytism after 
he and his wife engaged in a religious discussion with a woman in his 
home.58  The government argued that it had to “protect a person’s 
religious beliefs and dignity from attempts to influence them by 
immoral and deceitful means.”59  The EC made a distinction between 
bearing “Christian witness and improper proselytism,” with the 
former involving “true evangelism” and the latter involving improper 
pressure and possibly even the “use of violence [and] brainwashing.”60  
The EC said that the Greek law was proper insofar as it was designed 
to punish only the latter, but that Greece had not sufficiently 
specified the way in which the applicant “had attempted to convince 
his neighbor by improper means.”61  The EC thus concluded that the 
applicant’s conviction was not justified “by a pressing social need” 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 408. 
 57. Id. at 409. 
 58. Kokkinakis v. Greece,  App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 397 (1994). 
 59. Id. at 421. 
 60. Id. at 422. 
 61. Id. 
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and that the law was not “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued 
or . . . for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”62 
In Valsamis v. Greece, a Jehovah’s Witness student in the state 
secondary education school refused to take part in the celebration of 
the National Day school parade commemorating the outbreak of war 
between Greece and Italy in 1940.63  Her parents contended that 
pacifism is a “fundamental tenet of their religion and forbids [even 
indirect] conduct or practice associated with war.”64  The school had 
previously exempted her from attendance at religious education 
lessons and Orthodox Mass, but suspended her from school for one 
day for failure to attend the parade.65  The applicant argued that 
Article 9 guaranteed her right to the “negative freedom not to 
manifest, by gestures of support, any convictions or opinions contrary 
to her own” and that the punishment “stigmatised and marginalised 
her.”66  The EC rejected the argument and held that Article 9 did not 
confer a right to exemption from disciplinary rules which were 
applied generally and neutrally, and that there had been no 
interference with her right to manifest her religion.67  The ECHR 
Commission decision from which the student appealed had noted that 
Article 9 protects “only acts and gestures of individuals which really 
express the conviction in question.”68 
In Hasan v. Bulgaria, Muslim believers sought to replace the 
leadership of their religious organization, thereby causing divisions in 
the Muslim community.69  Soon thereafter, the Bulgarian government 
declared the election of the leader of one of the factions null and 
void, removed him from the position, and set up a temporary 
governing body pending the election of a new permanent Muslim 
leader.70  The applicants argued that the religious community should 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294, 298 (1997). 
 64. Id. at 297. 
 65. Id. at 298. 
 66. Id. at 317. 
 67. Id.  In A. v. United Kingdom, the EC rejected a claim of exemption from paying taxes, 
some of which would be used to fund the military, on pacifist grounds.  The EC said that the 
obligation to pay taxes is “a general one which has no specific conscientious implications in 
itself . . . Article 9 does not confer . . . the right to refuse on the basis of her convictions to abide 
by legislation . . . which applies neutrally and generally in the public sphere, without impinging 
on the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 9.”  A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10295/82, 6 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 558 (1984). 
 68. Valsamis, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 306. 
 69. App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, 1347 (2002). 
 70. Id. 
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be allowed to organize according to its own rules, including choosing 
its own leaders.71  The government argued that it “had a duty to 
maintain a climate of tolerance and mutual respect” between 
independent religious institutions, and that the state’s functioning in 
this capacity had no bearing on the Muslims’ right to practice their 
religion.72  The EC ruled against the Bulgarian government, noting 
that religious communities traditionally exist in organized structures 
and find meaning in religious ceremonies and the religious ministers 
conducting those ceremonies73:  “Participation in the life of the 
community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion.”74  The EC also 
noted that “but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of 
religion . . . excludes any discretion on the part of the State to 
determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such 
beliefs are legitimate.”75  The EC held that the interference was not 
“prescribed by law” in that it was “arbitrary and was based on legal 
provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive, 
and did not meet the required standards of clarity and 
foreseeability.”76 
This short list of cases shows the EC’s commitment to impose 
exacting scrutiny on any restrictions to religious freedom, particularly 
with regard to the proportionality test.  If a government is pursuing a 
legitimate aim, but is doing so by direct proscription of religious 
freedom when other means may be available, the law will not stand.  
However, Valsamis indicates that the Court will not defer to religious 
sensibilities when the law does not explicitly restrict one’s right to 
manifest religion, but is instead a generally applicable law that 
requires what the Court views as rather innocuous participation in a 
public function.  The Article now moves to an analysis of whether 
legislation currently on the books in certain states, and ostensibly 
grounded in the “necessity” exceptions of the ICCPR and ECHR, is 
in fact faithful to the tenets of those documents and the jurisprudence 
interpreting them. 
 
 71. Id. at 1357. 
 72. Id. at 1357-58. 
 73. Id. at 1358-59. 
 74. Id. at 1359. 
 75. Id. at 1362.  “State action favoring one leader of a divided religious community or 
undertaken with the purpose of forcing the community to come together under a single 
leadership against its own wishes” is an interference with freedom of religion.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 1365. 
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III.  LEGISLATION “NECESSARY TO PROTECT PUBLIC 
SAFETY, ORDER, HEALTH, OR MORALS OR THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHERS” 
A. Legislation 
Silvio Ferrari says that in the last ten to twenty years a new breed 
of religiously motivated terrorists, willing to kill in the name of God, 
has appeared.77  This reality has occasioned a pressing need to find a 
balance between the values of freedom and security, to determine 
how to “reconcile religious freedom and national security in a way 
that makes it possible to simultaneously enjoy them both.”78  Many 
governments around the world have adopted measures that are 
ostensibly “necessary to ensure national security and public order, 
and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of other citizens” are 
protected from extremist religions or religious ideas.79  Ferrari 
identifies three broad types of government intrusion into religious 
liberty since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States:  (1) government creation of laws restricting a variety of 
fundamental rights that indirectly affect religious liberty, such as laws 
making it more difficult to obtain visas, thereby inhibiting missionary 
activities; (2) government scrutiny of religious organizations, 
including the examination of internal operations of religious 
organizations to ascertain whether the organization might be a front 
for terrorist activity; and (3) government intrusion into religious 
beliefs, such as the investigation of subversive doctrine that is 
“tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic fundamentals 
of civil society.”80 
 
 77. Silvio Ferrari, Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After 
September 11, 2004 BYU L. REV. 357, 358. 
 78. Id. at 359. 
 79. See, e.g., The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Worship and 
Religious Organizations (New Version) art. 3, as published in NARODNOYE SLOVO (Tashkent, 
Uzb.), May 15, 1998, translated in http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/uzbeklaw.html. 
 80. Ferrari, supra note 77, at 361. 
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Examples of such restrictive legislation abound.81  In Russia, the 
Federal Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity82 forbids “the 
creation and operation of social and religious associations or other 
associations which have goals or actions directed at the conduct of 
extremist activity.”83  Such prohibited extremist activities include 
“propaganda of exclusivity, advocating either supremacy or 
inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national, 
religious or linguistic affiliation.”84  This prohibition is not limited 
under the law to those acts committed in public, and one 
commentator contends that religious groups could face extremism 
accusations based on private doctrinal discussions during regular 
worship services if the group claims exclusive truth based on the 
“superiority” of its doctrine.85 
Another example is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
enacted in Singapore in 1990.86  For the purpose of protecting 
religious harmony (and by extension public safety, order, and so on), 
the Act gives the state the power to issue a restraining order against 
any religious representative who excites “disaffection against the 
President or the Government while, or under the guise of, 
propagating or practising any religious belief.”87  Such an order can 
restrain the religious representative from addressing a congregation 
or publishing any text without prior permission of the state 
authorities.88 
 
 81. In addition to the legislation specifically discussed, testimony before the Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus indicated that Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and some states in India have all 
passed or are considering passing anti-conversion legislation that threatens prosecution for 
sharing one’s faith with another.  Anti-Conversion Legislation in India: Staff Briefing Before the 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus & Task Force for Int’l Religious Freedom, July 21, 2006 
(statement of Angela C. Wu, Dir. of Int’l Advocacy, the Becket Fund), available at 
http://becketfund.org/files/581fd.pdf [hereinafter Wu]. 
 82. Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection 
of Legislation] 2002, No. 30, Item 3031. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, Chapter 167A, available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (Search “Go To Cap No.” for “167A”) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).  See 
also Ferrari, supra note 77, at 369-70. 
 87. Ferrari, supra note 77, at 369-70. 
 88. Id.  The Bulgarian Consolidated Draft Law on Religious Denominations is an example 
of a more procedurally focused effort to curtail religious activity by, among other things, 
enacting very difficult registration procedures applied to non-Bulgarian Orthodox churches 
where non-registration makes practicing one’s religion freely virtually impossible.  For a 
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A third example of legislation limiting religious liberty using the 
necessity language of the ICCPR and the ECHR is the Law of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and Religious 
Organizations.89  The law lays out numerous guarantees of religious 
freedom that are qualified with significant restrictions in the name of 
national security, public order, life, health, morals, and rights and 
freedoms of others.  For example, Article 5 of the law outlaws 
“actions aimed at converting believers of one religion into another” 
and declares inadmissible “the use of religion for anti-state and anti-
constitutional propaganda . . . and for other actions against the state, 
society and individual.”90 
Finally, since at least 1998, France has actively sought to restrict 
the development of new religious movements (NRMs).  In 2000, the 
French National Assembly unanimously approved a law that created 
a civil mechanism for the dissolution of religious entities, placed 
restrictions on the locations of specified “new religious movements,” 
prohibited dissemination of information regarding new religious 
movements, and criminalized “mental manipulation” or 
brainwashing.91  The effects of this and other initiatives targeting 
religious minorities include, among other things, harassment in the 
workplace, harassment at school, heightened investigations of 
religious organizations’ financial management systems, imposition of 
excessive taxes on donations to religious organizations, and denial of 
child custody to a parent based on the parent’s religion.92 
 
discussion of the law, see Atanas Krussteff, An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian 
Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 575, 589-600. 
 89. See The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Worship and Religious 
Organizations, supra note 79. 
 90. Grant Garrard Beckwith, Note, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious 
Liberty—An Appraisal of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations,” 2000 BYU L. REV. 997, 1042. 
 91. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], June 13, 2001, p. 9337; see also Hannah Clayson Smith, Note, 
Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite at Risk For New Religious Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. 
REV. 1099, 1118-22. 
 92. Smith, supra note 91, at 1116-17 nn.95-101 (detailing instances of each of these effects 
and noting at least eleven cases in which mothers were denied custody of children in divorce 
proceedings because they were members of a NRM). 
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B. Legitimate or Illegitimate Restrictions on Religious Freedom? 
1. Facially Invalid? 
a. Overbreadth and Vagueness.  The initial question in 
evaluating the laws laid out in Part III.A. is whether, to borrow 
categories from U.S. constitutional law, the laws are facially invalid 
under the ICCPR or the ECHR.  In the United States, a plaintiff may 
challenge the facial validity of a law regulating speech by arguing that 
it is either unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague.93  
Overbreadth requires a showing that a law punishes a “‘substantial’ 
amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.’”94  Such a showing invalidates the entire law 
“out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law 
may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech—especially 
when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.”95  
Overbreadth is rarely found, however, because the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognizes that blocking application of a law to constitutionally 
unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally unprotected 
conduct, could have substantial social costs.  Thus, the “strong 
medicine” of overbreadth invalidation is used sparingly.96 
The related doctrine of vagueness allows a challenge to a law 
that is not a “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
 
 93. It is important to note that while overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply primarily, 
if not exclusively, to freedom of speech in U.S. jurisprudence, international law protections of 
freedom of religion specifically include manifestations involving speech, namely teaching 
religious points of view.  See NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.  One commentator has noted that 
international law “expressly links religious liberty with virtually every major human right, 
including, inter alia, freedom of association, freedom of speech, the norm of non-discrimination, 
[and] due process.”  Adams, supra note 5, at 23. 
 94. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). 
 95. Id. at 119.  This chilling effect may cause people to “abstain from protected speech—
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 96. Id. at 120.  The Court says, “Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed 
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily 
associated with speech,” thus limiting the doctrine to content-based legislation.  Id. at 124.  
Sullivan and Gunther question whether the overbreadth doctrine functions as “simply one 
application of strict scrutiny” to the extent that overbreadth cases typically emphasize the 
availability of more carefully tailored means to achieve legislative ends, a hallmark of strict 
scrutiny analysis.  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1298-99 (14th ed. 2001). 
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conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.”97  
Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald Gunther point out that the doctrine 
draws on the procedural due process requirement of adequate notice, 
but is also aimed at preventing selective enforcement.98  The Court 
has said the purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to prevent “arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement” of a law.99  It has found laws 
unconstitutional for vagueness where essentially “no standard of 
conduct is specified at all,” and as a result “‘men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning.’”100 
b. “Prescribed by Law”  Though the ICCPR and the ECHR 
use the phrase “prescribed by law” rather than overbreadth and 
vagueness, the terms have analogous aspects.  In Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, the applicant argued that the absence of any description of 
the “objective substance” of the offense of proselytism “would tend 
to make it possible for any kind of religious conversation or 
communication to be caught by the provision” and that the vague 
language risked “extendability” by the police and the courts to 
permissible exercises of religious freedom.101  The EC rejected this 
contention, noting “that the wording of many statutes is not 
absolutely precise” and “that many laws are inevitably couched in 
terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague.”102  The EC 
further noted that the existence of a body of settled national case law 
sufficiently enabled the applicant to regulate his conduct according to 
the law.103  Though the Court rejected the overbreadth and vagueness 
contention, its discussion indicates the possibility that a law may be 
struck down under the ECHR if it does not sufficiently enable 
citizens to regulate their conduct under the law.104 
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the EC 
further explained the concept of “prescribed by law,” saying: 
[T]he expression ‘prescribed by law’ . . . not only requires that an 
impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law, but also 
refers to the quality of the law in question, which must be 
 
 97. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951). 
 98. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 96, at 1299. 
 99. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). 
 100. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Const. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
 101. App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 419 (1994). 
 102. Id. at 420. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is to say, formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the individual . . . to regulate his 
conduct.105 
To meet these requirements, a domestic law “must afford a measure 
of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention . . . .  
Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope 
of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the 
manner of its exercise.”106  Thus, as with the overbreadth and 
vagueness doctrines, the “prescribed by law” requirement of both the 
ECHR and the ICCPR guards against laws that do not provide 
sufficient warning as to what conduct the law proscribes. 
c. “Necessary.”  Another way to challenge facial validity under 
the ICCPR or the ECHR would be to argue that the law in question 
could never be necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others or, to use the 
language of the ECHR, the law could never be “necessary in a 
democratic society.”107  Thus, it must be struck down as facially 
invalid. 
d. Analysis of National Legislation for Facial Invalidity.  A 
facial validity challenge depends upon the specific wording of the 
statute in question.  For this reason, the analysis here will assess the 
facial validity of the several representative statutes described above.  
Turning first to the question of necessity, none of the statutes would 
likely fail as facially invalid under the ICCPR or ECHR on the 
ground that the restrictions could never be necessary in a democratic 
society.  One could imagine any number of scenarios under which 
even the most restrictive language of the statutes might be necessary.  
For example, Russia’s Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity 
forbids “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy or 
inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion.”108  One can easily 
imagine a situation in which members of one religion might propagate 
 
 105. App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep 306, 333 (2002).  The Court has also described the 
concept as providing “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities.”  Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep 552, 
560 (1999). 
 106. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, 35 H. R. Rep. at 333. 
 107. See ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9, ¶ 2. 
 108. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation of 
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031. 
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their religious beliefs in such a demeaning or aggressive way that 
others’ fundamental rights—to privacy or to their own religious 
freedom—are violated.  On a broader scale, the tensions that 
sometimes exist between religions could, based upon active spreading 
of disparaging ideas about a competing religion, lead to unrest that 
threatens the public order or safety.  It would then be necessary for 
the government to restrict such propaganda and advocacy.109  Further, 
research for this Article did not discover a single case in which a law 
was declared facially invalid on this ground. 
Although vagueness and overbreadth are closer questions, the 
examples referenced here would likely survive an overbreadth 
challenge as well.  Though the laws might apply to religious 
expression that the government could not in some cases justify 
restricting, the plainly legitimate sweep of these laws in relation to 
that possibility would likely protect them from an overbreadth 
challenge.  The exception to this conclusion would be the Uzbek 
provision prohibiting “actions aimed at converting believers from one 
religion to another.”110  In Kokkinakis, the EC expressly allowed 
proselytizing where a religious believer expressed his ideas in an 
inoffensive way, and there was no evidence that he had taken 
advantage of the “inexperienced, feebleness of mind, and 
ingenuousness” of the other person.111  Thus, a blanket ban on 
attempting to convert another, without specifying what would 
constitute an impropriety, might fail a facial validity challenge based 
on overbreadth. 
The vagueness question, with which the ECHR has dealt 
explicitly, may be a closer question because a religious organization 
or one of its members could easily have difficulty determining what 
activities or teaching of its religion might count as “exclusionary” or 
“anti-state.”  For example, imagine that a debate occurred between 
an atheist and a Christian at a public institution.  Suppose the atheist 
argued that being a moral person and having a theoretical basis for 
moral opinions does not require belief in a higher power.  In 
response, the Christian argued that a philosophically sound moral 
system requires the existence of a higher power.  He went on to argue 
that among the higher power “options,” the God of Christianity is the 
 
 109. A similar argument would apply to the restrictions on NRMs in France and the anti-
propaganda provisions of the Singapore law.  See supra notes 91, 86. 
 110. See Beckwith, supra note 90. 
 111. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 414 (1994). 
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most rational explanation for a moral system and for being a moral 
person. Assume also that the Christian did not explicitly condemn 
other religious viewpoints, nor did he attempt to persuade audience 
members to convert to Christianity. The aim was a religious 
explanation for morality, held out as superior to other religious or 
non-religious explanations. 
The question with respect to vagueness (or “prescribed by law”) 
is whether the law is “formulated with sufficient precision” to enable 
citizens to regulate conduct accordingly.112  It is not clear whether the 
foregoing example of the debate at a public institution could be 
prosecuted as extremist under Russia’s law prohibiting “propaganda 
of exclusivity, advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens 
on the basis of religion,” because the statute is not clear about these 
terms.113  As such, the law does not put the Christian debater 
sufficiently on notice that he could be prosecuted.  The Becket Fund 
for Religious Liberty criticized Sweden’s Law Against Expression of 
Disrespect on similar “no objective assessment” grounds:  “This law 
prohibits the expression of ‘disrespect’ towards favored minority 
groups” but “lacks any objective standard for identifying 
disrespect.”114  A similar lack of objective standard exists with regard 
to “exclusion” in the Russia statute, “propaganda” in the Uzbekistan 
statute, and “disaffection” in the Singapore statute.115  Even so, it is 
not clear that the EC would invalidate any of these measures on 
vagueness grounds given its care to note that laws cannot account for 
every eventuality.116  Further, because the language in each of the 
statutes can be construed as furthering a legitimate aim of 
government (proscribing treatment of other citizens as inferior on the 
basis of religion), it is unlikely they would be struck down as facially 
invalid on vagueness grounds.  Rather than invalidating a law based 
on necessity, overbreadth, or vagueness, it can be predicted that the 
 
 112. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, App. No. 45701/99, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 306, 333 (2002).  
This is, of course, a separate question from the question of whether the prohibition’s aim is 
legitimate even if it is not vague. 
 113. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031. 
 114. Peng Voong, Speech at the United Nations 61st Comm’n on Human Rights (April 14, 
2005) (transcript available at http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/386.html). 
 115. See Part III.A for the full language of each of these statutes. 
 116. Metro. Church of Bessarabia, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 333 (“The level of precision 
required of domestic legislation—which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality—
depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field which it 
is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed.”). 
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EC would want to adjudicate an “as-applied” claim to determine the 
necessity of the statute under the particular circumstances, and 
whether any conviction under the statute was proportional to the aim 
pursued. 
2. Invalid “As-Applied”?  The nature of an “as-applied” 
inquiry depends on the facts of particular cases.  However, 
hypothetical situations to which these laws may apply can be 
instructive.  It seems clear that Russia’s prohibition on “exclusion,”117 
for example, could easily be applied to proscribe the Christian 
debater’s claim that Christianity is a superior basis for morality as 
compared to other religions.  It is equally clear that such an 
application would violate the ICCPR and the ECHR.  Insofar as the 
speech was an explanation of a religiously motivated belief, the EC 
would probably rule as it did in Kokkinakis by saying that expression 
of religious conviction absent overt pressure or coercion cannot be 
punished as criminal.118  Further, prosecution of such a manifestation 
of religious belief would likely be scrutinized very closely, in part 
because it would constitute a “direct effect” on freedom of religion.  
As such, it would violate the principle of proportionality unless the 
necessity the government puts forth was closely connected to a 
legitimate aim (and the more direct the restriction, the more difficult 
this is to show).  The debater would have to show that the views he 
expressed in the speech were intimately tied to his religious belief, 
since not every opinion or preference qualifies as a belief under the 
instruments.119  Because the speech involved “some coherent view on 
fundamental problems”120 and was “obviously related to religious 
conviction,”121 he would satisfy this requirement.  Thus, to justify 
prosecuting the debater, the government would have to show some 
specific necessity, under the circumstances, that made the restriction 
necessary.122 
 
 117. See Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiikoi Federatii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2002 No. 30, Item 3031. 
 118. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 414 (1994). 
 119. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 10. 
 120. Id. 
 121. NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321. 
 122. The Article discusses in detail below the question of whether such a speech at a public 
institution would qualify as an endorsement of a particular religious view and thus as 
proscribable to protect the secular nature of the state.  On the facts of this hypothetical, such a 
debate would not be seen as an endorsement by the school due to the nature of debate. 
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Beyond this particular hypothetical, the Singapore Maintenance 
of Religious Harmony Act’s prohibition of exciting disaffection could 
easily be applied to restrain religiously motivated opposition to 
government policy or practice.123  Because many religious traditions 
(not to mention democratic principles generally) view actively 
opposing unjust or immoral government action or cultural tendencies 
as essential to their mission, this proscription could easily curtail 
important religious freedoms.  In addition, many traditions actively 
attempt to persuade individuals and government of the correctness of 
their views on a whole host of issues that touch the political arena.  
Much of this activity could be viewed under these laws as subversive, 
and thus proscribable merely for being in conflict with a government 
policy or declaration.  What if a citizen of the United States opposed 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the 
Court struck down a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy, and 
distributed fliers in the community condemning the decision and 
expressing moral disagreement with homosexual sodomy?124  Under 
the language at issue, the government could easily construe the act as 
spreading disaffection against the government.  However, such 
activity is expressly allowable under the ICCPR, and without some 
justification beyond the substantive religious disagreement, such as 
advocacy of violence, other forms of disruptive dissent, or violation of 
others’ rights, the restriction would violate the instrument.125 
Similarly, while France’s NRM law allows dissolution of new 
religious entities ostensibly to guard against abuse of the religious 
freedoms of others, a government’s power of heightened investigation 
and dissolution of religious entities simply because they are new 
illegitimately restricts religious freedom absent some particularized 
necessity for the restriction.126  In addition, singling out members of 
NRMs for individualized restriction simply because of membership in 
a minority religious group, without showing a specific “pressing social 
need,” is illegitimate.127  By extension, such restrictions restrain the 
freedom of those who may want to convert to an NRM, thus causing a 
 
 123. See Ferrari, supra note 77, at 370 for the text of the Singapore statute. 
 124. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 125. See General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 7. 
 126. Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 8 (stating that necessity clauses are exhaustive, such that 
restrictions not listed are not allowed); see also Smith, supra note 91 (giving examples of 
restrictions on the locations of new religious movements in France). 
 127. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 422 (1994) (holding 
that the government must show that the applicant’s conviction was justified in the circumstances 
by a pressing social need). 
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substantial violation of a person’s freedom to believe what he or she 
wants and the freedom to belong to the religion of one’s choice.  The 
treatment of religious minority groups in France is exactly the type of 
religious discrimination that the ICCPR and the ECHR forbid.  The 
language of these laws and others like them, while probably not 
facially invalid, pose serious risks of restricting religious activity for 
reasons other than the necessity required under the ICCPR and the 
ECHR.  Whether the laws are ultimately compatible with the 
instruments in practice depends in large part on whether the 
governments administering them actually require a showing of 
necessity before pursuing prosecutions for religious expression under 
those laws.  Given the phraseology of many of the laws and the ways 
they have been put into practice thus far in places like France, it 
cannot be predicted that the ICCPR and the ECHR’s protections for 
religious expression will be properly followed, and the broad 
language of the laws will be at least partly to blame. 
IV.  THE “PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM” 
A. Legislation and Case Law 
In addition to laws curtailing religious freedom under the specific 
necessities of the ICCPR and the ECHR, some governments justify 
curtailing religious freedom under the “principle of secularism.”  This 
principle contains the notion that government and society must be 
protected from religious overreaching in order to preserve the secular 
nature of government and the public.  For example, France’s “law on 
secularism” went into effect on September 2, 2004 and reads as 
follows:  “In public [primary and secondary schools], the wearing of 
symbols or clothing through which the pupils ostensibly manifest a 
religious appearance is prohibited.”128  Since then, a total of forty-
eight students have been expelled under the law, most of them 
Muslim girls who refused to remove their religious headscarves in 
class.129  In banning the wearing of religious symbols, one French 
official said that one purpose of the law was to encourage “mutual 
 
 128. France—Banning Religious Attire—United Shiks, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/96.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).  See also 
Law No. 2004-228 of March 3, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], March 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
 129. See French Schools Expel 48 Over Headscarf Ban, EXPATICA,  
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=58&story_id=15996 (last visited Oct. 
5, 2006). 
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respect,” thus implying that wearing a religious symbol to school is 
disrespectful to those of other religions.130  Similarly, in 2003, a 
Swedish pastor was convicted and sentenced to one month 
imprisonment under a Swedish law banning disrespectful speech.131  
Though the principle of secularism was not invoked explicitly in the 
case, the idea of protecting others from offense and disrespect echoes 
one of France’s justifications for its “secularism” laws. 
While research for this Article did not identify any HRC cases 
dealing explicitly with this issue, the HRC has indirectly considered 
the question in one case.  In Riley v. Canada,  the Committee found in 
favor of the Canadian Government, which had allowed a Sikh 
member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to wear his 
turban in place of the traditional “mountie” Stetson and forage cap 
that comprised the standard uniform.132  Two retired RCMP officers 
brought the complaint, arguing that the display of such a symbol by 
the national police constituted a state endorsement of religion by 
granting “special status” to the Sikh adherent.  The officers claimed 
that in order to protect their rights under Article 18 of the Covenant, 
“the State should remain secular.”133  In rather conclusory fashion, the 
Committee held that “the authors [of the complaint] have failed to 
show how the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant has been 
affected by allowing a Khals Sikh officer to wear religious symbols.”134  
In so holding, the HRC rejected the idea that a “principle of 
secularism” required prohibiting a manifestation of religious belief by 
a member of a state-controlled institution.135 
In a similar clash, Turkey removed the air force high command’s 
director of legal affairs for “having adopted unlawful fundamentalist 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Sweden—Criminalizing Religious Speech—Åke Green, BECKET FUND FOR 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/93.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2006); see also discussion infra, Part V. 
 132. Decision of the Human Rights Comm., No. 1048/2002, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/1048/2002 (2002). 
 133. Id. ¶ 3.3. 
 134. Id. ¶ 4.2. 
 135. Interestingly, in Goldman v. Weinberger, the U.S. Supreme Court gave significantly 
more deference to military regulations that interfere with the rights of service personnel.  475 
U.S. 503, 509 (1986).  The Court held that prohibiting a Jewish commissioned officer from 
wearing a yarmulke under an air force dress code regulation did not violate his religious liberty.  
Id. at 504.  The regulations “reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the 
military’s perceived need for uniformity.  The First Amendment therefore does not prohibit 
them from being applied to petitioner even though their effect is to restrict the wearing of the 
headgear required by his religious beliefs.”  Id. at 510. 
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opinions.”136  The Turkish government argued that the dismissal 
constituted a disciplinary sanction for failure to “uphold the secular 
nature of the state.”137  In upholding the dismissal, the EC said, in 
Kalaç v. Turkey, that the compulsory retirement was not an 
interference with the freedom of religion or belief, but “was intended 
to remove from the military legal service a person who had 
manifested his lack of loyalty to the foundation of the Turkish nation, 
namely secularism, which it was the task of the armed forces to 
guarantee.”138 
Following Kalaç, in Başpinar v. Turkey, the EC found that the 
discharge of a non-commissioned officer of the army was not a 
violation of his rights under Article 9 of the ECHR.139  The applicant 
contended that his dismissal was based on his religious convictions 
and the fact that his wife attempted to get a social security card with a 
photograph showing her carrying an Islamic scarf.140  The government 
asserted as its grounds for dismissal the applicant’s membership in 
sects known to have “unlawful fundamentalist tendencies,” his 
attendance at “ideological” meetings, and his disciplinary offences 
while in the army.  According to Turkey, “any attitude or conduct 
such as the applicant’s antisocial character or his wife’s . . . Islamic 
scarf had not been taken as the sole basis for his discharge from the 
army.”141 
In response, the applicant argued that the principle of secularism 
should guarantee freedom of religion and conscience rather than 
operating as a bar to manifestation of religious belief.142  The EC 
recognized that religion is one of the foundations of a democratic 
society, but said that where “several religions coexist within one and 
the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this 
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and 
ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”143  Further, 
The Court considers that in choosing to pursue a military career the 
applicant was accepting of his own accord a system of military 
discipline that by its very nature implied the possibility of placing 
 
 136. Kalaç v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 552, 552 (1997). 
 137. Id. at 559. 
 138. Id. at 563. 
 139. App. No. 45631/99, 36 Eur H.R. Rep. CD1 (2003). 
 140. Id. at CD4. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at CD5. 
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on certain of the rights and freedoms of the members of the armed 
forces limitations which could not be imposed on civilians.144 
The EC said that states may forbid “an attitude inimical to an 
established order reflecting the requirements for military service” and 
require “a duty for military personnel to refrain from participating in 
the Islamic fundamentalist movement.”145  Finally, the EC noted with 
approval that the Supreme Military Council’s dismissal order was not 
based on religious beliefs or opinions or performance of religious 
duties, but rather on “his conduct and activities in breach of military 
discipline and the principle of secularism.”146 
The EC has also developed the principle of secularism in 
analyzing alleged violations of Article 11 of the ECHR, which 
delineates the freedom of assembly and association and uses 
limitation language similar to that of Article 9.147  In Refah Partisi (the 
Welfare Party) v. Turkey, the EC rejected a challenge brought under 
Article 11 by a Turkish political party that had been dissolved by 
Turkish authorities.148  The European court noted that the Turkish 
Constitutional Court dissolved the party, and banned its leaders from 
holding similar office in any other party for five years, “on the ground 
that it had become a ‘centre’ of activities contrary to the principles of 
secularism.”149  In support of the holding, the Constitutional Court 
cited numerous speeches given by members of the party advocating 
violent overthrow of the government.150  The Turkish court also noted 
that “secularism was one of the indispensable conditions of 
democracy” and that “[i]ntervention by the State to preserve the 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at CD6 (emphasis added). 
 147. According to the ECHR, 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  This article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. 
ECHR, supra note 9, art. 11. 
 148. App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003). 
 149. Id. at 9 
 150. Id. at 13-17. 
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secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary 
in a democratic society.”151  Further, 
Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious 
matters cannot be regarded as interference contrary to the 
requirements of a democratic society . . . .  Secularism, which is also 
the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the philosophical 
essence of life in Turkey.  Within a secular State religious feelings 
simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and 
legislative provisions.  Those are not matters to which religious 
requirements and thought apply.152 
The EC held in favor of the Turkish government, and in doing so 
discussed the relationship between democracy and religion.  First, the 
Court reiterated the necessity of placing restrictions on religion “in 
order to reconcile the interests of various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected.”153  Second, it noted “the State’s role 
as the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs,” but found that this duty “is incompatible 
with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious 
beliefs.”154  Third, the Court said “that in a democratic society the 
State may limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by 
wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes 
with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public 
order and public safety,”155 and it may “impose on its serving or future 
civil servants . . . the duty to refrain from taking part in the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement, whose goal and plan of action is to bring 
about the pre-eminence of religious rules.”156  Finally, the Court said 
that “the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 11, and by Arts. 9 and 10 of 
the Convention, cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an 
association, through its activities, jeopardizes that State’s institutions, 
of the right to protect those institutions.”157 
 
 151. Id. at 13. 
 152. Id. at 18-19. 
 153. Id. at 33. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 34.  The Court emphasized the context of Turkey where measures taken to 
prevent undue pressure on students may be legitimate under Article 9(2).  Id.  This regulation 
may include limiting the manifestation of the rites and symbols of the majority religion by 
“imposing restrictions as to the place and manner of such manifestation with the aim of ensuring 
peaceful co-existence between students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and 
the beliefs of others.”  Id. 
 157. Id. at 34-35. 
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In its construction of Articles 10 and 11, the EC noted two other 
aspects of the protection of individual rights that round out the 
picture.  First, freedom of expression in Article 10 “is applicable, 
subject to para. 2, not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”158  As the 
HRC notes in its General Comments to the ICCPR, an integral part 
of religious freedom is the freedom to express religious views, 
whether through publication and dissemination of religious materials, 
or through religious teaching.159  Thus, the spirit of the religious 
freedom protections in both the ICCPR and the ECHR includes the 
freedom to espouse religious ideas and practice religious activity that 
may be unpopular with majority religions or society at large, again 
subject to the necessity limitations in both instruments.  As the 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty said in a recent Legal 
Memorandum to the government of Sri Lanka, “Although [religious] 
beliefs may be unsettling to some, the freedom to discuss and 
disseminate such controversial beliefs—orally or in writing, privately 
or in public, individually or in community—is firmly embedded in the 
freedom to manifest religious belief.”160 
Second, in Özdep v. Turkey, the EC found that Turkey had 
violated Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of association) by 
dissolving the Freedom and Democracy Party of Turkey.161  The 
Court called it “essential” that it found nothing in the Özdep’s 
program “that can be considered a call for the use of violence, an 
uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic principles.”162  
Further, as the Court noted, “It is the essence of democracy to allow 
diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that 
call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that 
they do not harm democracy itself.”163  Thus, when unpopular ideas 
do not explicitly threaten a democratic government or the rights of 
others, they are protected under Article 11 of the ECHR. 
 
 158. Id. at 33.  See also Özdep v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 674, 701 
(2001). 
 159. General Comment No. 22, supra note 17, ¶ 4. 
 160. Memorandum from Emilie L. Kao, Dir. of Int’l Advocacy, The Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, to President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister 
Mahinda Rajapakse, Sri Lanka 7 (July 22, 2004) (on file with the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty), avaible at http://www.lankaliberty.com/efforts/SLOpinionLetter.pdf. 
 161. 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705. 
 162. Id. at 702. 
 163. Id. at 703. 
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B. Analysis of Secularism 
There are significant problems with the principle of secularism as 
a ground for restriction of religious liberty, and with the EC’s 
enforcement of the principle.  The first, and most obvious, is that 
neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR list defending secularism in 
principle as a ground upon which the manifestation of religious belief 
may be restricted.  As discussed above, the necessity clauses are to be 
construed “strictly” as an exhaustive list of possible justifications.164  
Thus, defending the secular nature of the government from religious 
influence, without a more specific showing that such influence is 
actually a threat to the public welfare, is not a sufficient reason to 
curtail religious freedom. 
Second, the principle of secularism contradicts the “axiomatic” 
principle that robust religious pluralism is fundamental to 
democracy.165  To the extent that the principle of secularism functions 
as an exclusionary mechanism for public expression of religious views, 
it is in conflict with the robust pluralism embraced by both the ECHR 
and the ICCPR.  The pluralism embodied in these instruments is 
normative rather than descriptive.  That is, it is not merely an 
observation that different religions exist, but rather a requirement 
that governments allow religions to flourish in society so long as this 
flourishing does not violate specifically defined limits.  Such limits 
may not, however, require a religious believer to change his or her 
manifestation of religious belief and practice based simply on 
suspicion of religiously informed opinions or specific religious groups, 
or in keeping democratic government free from the influence of 
religious ideas. 
Central to the notion of pluralism is full participation in public 
life without being required to leave religious motivations or beliefs in 
private.166  Thus, the Turkish government’s position in Refah Partisi 
that “religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, 
public affairs and legislative provisions”167 is incompatible with the 
concept of pluralism as indissociable from democracy.  The EC’s 
 
 164. See Kiss, supra note 22, at 308. 
 165. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of religious pluralism as fundamental to democracy. 
 166. Note that here the Article is not speaking of active efforts to install a theocratic form of 
government in place of a democratic form of government.  This would clearly require 
restriction.  Rather, the Article refers to religiously informed and even explicitly religious ideas 
put forth in hopes of helping shape a more effective democratic society. 
 167. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 1, 19 (2003). 
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endorsement of such a view is in conflict with its explicit endorsement 
of religious pluralism and its duty to require specific necessity to 
curtail religious freedom.  To the extent that Turkey and France, in 
their application of the principle of secularism, are simply shielding 
government and other citizens from the influence of committed 
religious believers, they violate the principle of pluralism, and by 
extension, the principles of democracy.  Still more, to the extent that 
Turkey excludes participation in public government on the basis of 
certain religious practices or on the basis of membership in a religious 
group, or put a different way, conditions participation in public 
government on disavowal of such belief or membership, it violates the 
principle of pluralism. 
In its cases before the EC on this subject, Turkey seems to 
equivocate the notions of “secularism” and “democracy.”  In doing 
so, the basic argument is this:  protecting democracy in Turkey 
requires protecting government from the influence of religion, 
because in order to thrive as a democratic country we must keep our 
government “neutral” (meaning secular).  Thus arguing for the 
principle of secularism is merely arguing for the principle of 
democracy.  The EC seems to endorse this equivocation as within the 
margin of appreciation for Turkey by speaking of the democratic 
“context” in Turkey.168  Turkey is right to think that human rights are 
linked to the protection of democratic government in the ICCPR and 
the ECHR.169  However, neither instrument endorses the view that 
human rights, and particularly religious freedom, are linked to the 
protection of secular government, when secular means protected from 
the influence of religion.170  So long as protecting democracy (or 
secularism) consists of restricting religious expression that seeks to 
influence or criticize government (as in Turkey) or merely seeks to 
 
 168. See Başpinar v. Turkey, App. No. 45631/99, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD1, 5 (2003). 
 169. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
121, 148 (1998).  The Court stated: 
Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public order.  
That is apparent, first from the Preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very 
clear connection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the 
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a 
common understanding and observance of human rights. 
Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1.  Note that when the Article says human 
rights are not linked to protection of secular government, it is not meant to imply that they are 
linked to religious government instead.  The argument is not that government should be run by 
religion, but that democratic government does not necessarily entail secular government to the 
exclusion of active participation of religious adherents and religious views. 
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express religious sensibility in public (France’s ban on religious 
symbols in public schools), it is not justifiable under the ICCPR or the 
ECHR. 
Indeed, even the expression of a sentiment such as, “I would like 
my religion to hold a dominant place in government” or “according to 
the dictates of my religion, it should provide the rules by which our 
government operates,” without more, would not overcome the 
“pressing social need” requirement of both the ICCPR and the 
ECHR.  Theoretically, a large religious group’s expression of such 
sentiments and intent to act on them could pose a threat to public 
order.  Without an express threat of “undemocratic” activity, 
however, a mere possibility that such sentiment would threaten the 
public order or the fundamental rights of another would usually be 
too attenuated (and thus not pressing enough) under certain EC cases 
to require the group to dissolve or discontinue dissemination of the 
views.171  Thus, in Refah Partisi, the EC should have focused solely on 
the problematic violent statements of the political party rather than 
on a generalized need to protect the secular nature of the state from 
unpopular and critical views.172  Similarly, in Kalaç and Başpinar, the 
EC should not have entertained the idea that membership in a certain 
religious group or the failure to uphold the principle of secularism as 
such could be grounds (even if not the sole ground) for dismissal from 
a government position.  This is not to say that such dismissals could 
not occur if the nature of the religious expression is truly threatening.  
However, the EC’s decisions in deference to the principle of 
secularism set dangerous precedent for restriction solely on the basis 
of membership in a religious group. 
Turkey and France might argue that the government has a 
legitimate interest in protecting the secular character of government 
from religious influence because to do otherwise would give the 
appearance of an endorsement or establishment of religion.  
However, the ICCPR and the ECHR religion clauses do not forbid 
establishing a state religion so long as that establishment does not 
discriminate against other religions or curtail the religious freedom of 
 
 171. See Özdep v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 674, 702 (2001) 
(emphasizing the need for a call for violence or active rejection of democratic principles). 
 172. See Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 17.  One of those convicted of inciting the 
people to hatred on the ground of religion had said the following in Parliament:  “If you attempt 
to close down the Iman-Hatip theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, 
blood will flow.  It would be worse than in Algeria.  I too would like blood to flow.  That’s how 
democracy will be installed. . . . I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.”  Id. 
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members of the non-state or majority religion.173  Even assuming a 
state has a legitimate interest in avoiding an establishment of religion 
(and this author believes it does), the EC “principle of secularism” 
cases do not involve the danger of government-established religion.  
Instead, they all involve the religious manifestations of individuals or 
groups that express ideas in opposition to the government or 
expressive of unpopular religious viewpoints.  The motivation of the 
Turkish government in each instance has been expressly to insulate 
government from religious views.174  Turkey has put on no evidence 
that the removal of individuals from positions in government was 
necessitated by a need to avoid the appearance of an establishment of 
religion.  Similarly, there is no evidence that France’s ban on religious 
symbols was motivated by this concern, and even if it was, the ban is 
on individuals wearing religious symbols rather than the public school 
displaying religious symbols.  Thus, the religious expression the law 
curtails would not be mistaken for government endorsement of any 
particular religious viewpoint. 
Finally, as noted above, the necessity clauses of both instruments 
have in view a “pressing social need” to justify restrictions on 
religious liberty.175  Thus, a per se principle of excluding religious 
manifestation in public institutions (such as a blanket ban on wearing 
religious symbols) cannot possibly be justified under a strict construal 
of the necessity doctrine.176  While a situation may arise in which 
religious tensions in a public school, for instance, were so high that a 
temporary ban would be justified to maintain order or to protect 
others’ fundamental rights, the proscription would need to be more 
narrowly tailored than a blanket ban.  The government would have to 
show the “pressing social need,” and the ban would have to be 
proportionate to the need.  Such a showing would be burdensome 
without something more than the assumption that wearing religious 
symbols might convey disrespect of the religious views of another. 
The French Education Minister’s claim that the law calls for 
“mutual respect” assumes that France can show that religious 
symbols worn by public school students in France cause others to feel 
 
 173. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18; ECHR, supra note 9, art. 9. 
 174. See Refah Partisi, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 19. 
 175. The language of both documents reflects this in requiring a “necessity” to justify a 
restriction on religious liberty.  See supra note 9. 
 176. As noted above, the French law reads:  “In public [primary and secondary schools], the 
wearing of symbols or clothing through which the pupils ostensibly manifest a religious 
appearance is prohibited.”  France—Banning Religious Attire—United Sikhs, supra note 128. 
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disrespected.177  It further ignores the fact that a wholly different 
intent in religious symbolism is likely the motivation for most wearers 
of religious symbols.  Even if France could show that wearing such 
symbols caused others to feel disrespected, to justify the blanket ban 
France must then show that:  (1) causing another to feel disrespected 
by wearing a religious symbol is a violation of a fundamental right to 
not feel disrespected (a difficult showing); (2) the alleged disrespect 
caused by the religious symbols was stirring up the school so as to 
create a threat to public order; or (3) wearing religious symbols 
violated some well-ensconced moral order in France.178  Obviously, 
such a showing would be nearly impossible.  The EC’s acceptance of 
the principle of secularism as a justification for restricting religious 
liberty is not a faithful reading of the ICCPR and the ECHR, and 
improperly makes room for illegitimate justifications for those 
restrictions. 
V.  ÅKE GREEN: A CASE STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF 
“NECESSITY” LEGISLATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SECULARISM 
The case of Åke Green in Sweden provides a test case for the 
fitness of the principles analyzed above.  Green is a pastor in Sweden 
who was sentenced to one month imprisonment for preaching and 
publishing a sermon containing “‘contemptuous expression’ toward 
homosexuals.”179  In the sermon, Green called widespread practice of 
homosexuality “‘a deep cancerous tumor in the entire society’ and 
 
 177. See supra Part IV.A for a description of this official’s defense of the law on these 
grounds. 
 178. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 18.  “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may 
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”  Id. 
 179. See Voong, supra note 114.  Lest the Green case be viewed as anomalous, in July 2006, 
two Australian pastors faced jail time for publicly comparing Christianity with Islam.  See Aussie 
Pastors Face Jail Sentences for Expressing Beliefs, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY, Aug. 14, 2006, http://becketfund.org/index.php/article/520.html?PHPSESSID=d5e 
9038d6ce5bb50b184af4da8feaddf.  As of this writing, the case has not been resolved.  Similarly, 
in July 2006, four sisters from Mother Theresa’s Missionaries of Charity were arrested in India 
for offering to pray for AIDS patients in hospitals.  See Wu, supra note 81.  On July 21, 2006, 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty testified before the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus that at least five Indian states have recently begun enforcing or strengthening anti-
conversion laws, and that Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have recently proposed anti-conversion 
laws modeled after the Indian laws.  See id. 
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equated it with pedophilia.”180  Green lambasted the practice of 
homosexuality and lamented that “[o]ur country is facing a disaster of 
great proportions.”181  Green’s conviction came under a Swedish law 
prohibiting the expression of disrespect towards favored minority 
groups.182  The conviction and sentence were overturned by the 
Swedish Appeals Court (Göta Hövratt) in February 2005, which said 
that “it is not the role of a government composed of men to declare 
what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly teach one religious 
view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”183  It held 
that Green “had a right to preach ‘the Bible’s categorical 
condemnation of homosexual relations as a sin,’ even if that position 
was ‘alien to most citizens’ and even if Green’s views could be 
‘strongly questioned.’”184  The government petitioned Sweden’s 
Supreme Court to reexamine the case, and the Swedish court 
unanimously acquitted Green of all charges.185 
The Green case starkly raises the question of whether 
government may restrict clearly unpopular religious expression.  The 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued as Amicus Curiae that 
Green’s religious expression “falls squarely within the protections of 
Article 18” of the ICCPR.186  The brief argued that in preaching the 
sermon, Green was “fulfilling his role as a leader of his congregants to 
further their faith by teaching Christian doctrine and applying it to 
their lives.”187  With regard to whether proscribing the conduct was 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the brief argued that 
Green, “[f]ar from engaging in any conduct that put others at risk . . . 
 
 180. Keith B. Richburg, Swedish Hate-Speech Verdict Reversed: Sermon Condemning 
Homosexuals Ruled Not Covered By Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A16. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Brottsbalken [BrB] [Criminal Code] 16:8 (Swed.), translated in http://www.legislation 
line.org/upload/legislations/59/94/4c405aed10fb48cc256dd3732d76.pdf. 
 183. Voong, supra note 114. 
 184. Richburg, supra, note 180. 
 185. See Criminal Conviction for Preaching Overturned by Swedish High Court, THE 
BECKETT FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Nov. 29, 2005, http://becketfund.org/index.php/ 
article/450.html; see also Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 805 
(Swed.), available at http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/2005/Dom%20pa%20engelska%20B% 
201050-05.pdf. 
 186. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Åke 
Green at 2-3, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2005-11-29 p. 805 (Swed.), available 
at http://www.becketfund.org/pdfs/333_39.pdf. 
 187. Id. 
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did nothing more than proclaim a religious viewpoint.”188  The fact 
that his viewpoint was controversial and offended some people “does 
not remove his religious teaching from Article 18’s protections.”189  
Finally, the brief noted that many religions “make claims of absolute 
truth in prescribing certain views to be correct and certain conduct to 
be either moral or immoral” and such propensity “may inevitably 
cause offense.”190  However, “Article 18 provides that it is not the role 
of a government composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by 
punishing those who publicly teach one religious view of what is right, 
even if that view may offend others.”191 
Is the Becket Fund’s position correct under the ICCPR and the 
ECHR, or did this manifestation of religious belief cross into the 
realm of restriction?  Given the Swedish Supreme Court’s decision in 
Green’s favor, the case will likely go no further.  If the case had made 
it to the HRC or the EC, however, the conviction most likely would 
not have been upheld under the ICCPR or the ECHR.  First, the case 
did not involve the type of “influence” on government from a 
position of civil authority or civil servant that the Turkey cases did. 
Thus, the government of Sweden would not have been able to defend 
the conviction on the ground that it was protecting democratic (or 
“secular”) principles of government from undue religious influence.  
Second, while the sermon used rather offensive language, it did not 
advocate harm to homosexuals or threaten public disorder if the laws 
on homosexuality in Sweden were not changed.  Therefore, Sweden 
could not have defended the conviction on the public order grounds.  
Third, the sermon was not a threat to the public moral order 
(assuming a majority acceptance of homosexuality).  Disagreeing with 
a moral order is not equivalent to threatening a moral order, and 
more than a showing that the sermon challenged the public moral 
order would be required to restrict the law on that ground.  This 
conclusion is supported by the EC position that even opinions that 
may shock and offend deserve protection.192 
Finally, Sweden’s best argument may have been the one France 
has made to defend its secularism law, namely that the sermon 
 
 188. Id. at 4. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 5. 
 191. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 192. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98, 37 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 33 (2003). 
03__PARKER.DOC 3/9/2007  10:04 AM 
128 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:91 
“disrespects” homosexuals and causes offense to them.193  The facts 
show that this has clearly been the result of the sermon; in other 
words, Sweden is not just guessing that the view may offend many 
people.  However, subjective feelings of disrespect in general do not 
amount to a justification for restriction of religious freedom under the 
plain language of the ICCPR and ECHR.  Had Green gone into a 
personal harangue directed towards an individual homosexual using 
the same language he used in the sermon, the case would pose a 
different challenge.  Such a personal and specific attack would quite 
possibly violate the fundamental rights of another and thus be subject 
to restriction.  However, the distinction between a personal attack 
and a sermon denouncing homosexuality generally is an important 
one, because the former implicates others’ rights in a way that the 
latter does not.  In this case, the Becket Fund’s argument that Green 
should not be restricted in teaching religious tenets of his faith to his 
congregation would likely have prevailed in front of either judicial 
body.  This is only speculation.  Some of the deferential language 
used by the EC in the Turkey cases could have been applied in 
principle here and might have caused the case to go the other way.  
Even so, the ICCPR and the ECHR do not have in mind such 
expression as a ground for government restriction of the freedom to 
manifest religious belief. 
CONCLUSION 
The ICCPR and the ECHR are designed to give significant 
protection to public manifestation of religious belief.  The laws of 
certain countries pose threats to this protection because of their 
amorphous language and because they potentially allow restrictions 
on the manifestation of religious belief when a “necessity” for such 
restriction does not in fact exist. It is difficult to conclude exactly 
which laws pose the greatest risk of being applied illegitimately to 
curtail religious expression, but the EC and the HRC have generally 
made the right decisions on this score and have developed principles 
for curtailing the more egregious extensions of these laws restricting 
religious liberty.  The principle of secularism, however, is not 
sufficient, without more, to restrict religious belief under the ICCPR 
and the ECHR, and the EC has used language in its decisions that 
gives inappropriate deference to government attempts to defend 
 
 193. See supra Part IV.A for a description of this official’s defense of the law on these 
grounds. 
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restrictions on secularism grounds.  Åke Green’s conviction in 
Sweden was overturned before it reached the international courts, but 
other cases involving similar issues may soon give them a chance to 
decide the extent to which governments may restrict the expression of 
unpopular religious doctrine.194  Hopefully, either court would strike 
down convictions similar to Green’s and would take care to provide a 
careful analysis to give future guidance in assessing the appropriate 
balance between religious liberty and legitimate government 
restrictions on that liberty. 
 
 194. See supra note 179 for descriptions of Australian pastors and Indian nuns who have 
been arrested for religious expression. 
